

AIR

GB-A-1555

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt  
Chief, Berlin Operations Base  
Operational/CALL  
(MRP - Operational Notes)

17 November 1952

Attn: [ ]

1. In the course of a conversation the undersigned case officer had with CARLEY on 11 November 1952, the latter mentioned that since the death of Dr. Kurt SCHUMACHER, [ ]'s party standing has suffered some damage, not entirely on grounds for which he could be blamed. [ ] we know, had a very close personal relationship with the late party leader and his secretary, Frau RINGER. It now appears that he did not at all times make very judicious use of the freedom of action accorded him and that during the lifetime of SCHUMACHER he succeeded in cultivating quite a number of enemies and detractors. As an illustration of this point, CARLEY mentioned that [ ] obviously engaged in some free-wheeling at the expense of the party and that he was in the habit of countering pertinent queries by referring his questioners to Dr. SCHUMACHER ("I am on a secret mission for the old man."), under whose authority he claimed to be acting. Nobody, not even ELLENBAUER, would have taken it upon himself to ask SCHUMACHER for an explanation of [ ]'s activities.

2. Since SCHUMACHER's death, [ ] has been held to a strict accounting for what he does with his time and with the party's money, a state of affairs he does not seem to savor. CARLEY claims that [ ] committed an egregious error in judgment when he accepted the Yugoslav invitation, then despatched his wife to Yugoslavia, where she spent her time in a rather expensive hotel at the expense of the Yugoslav Government, while her husband travelled through the United States. He considers [ ] as even more out of line when [ ] his wife, and Frau RINGER went to Paris in a party-owned car, purportedly on party business, while the SPD treasurer caught a cold waiting at the ANW airport where [ ] was supposed to pick him up.

3. I mentioned to CARLEY that [ ] had made an excellent impression in the United States, quite in contradistinction to CARPENT. CARLEY stated that he thought matters could easily be mended, provided [ ] would adapt himself more readily to changed conditions and handle his particular problems in a more mature fashion. As an incidental comment, CARLEY stated that he considered the work of the Berlin [ ] organization as "unter aller Kritik". CARLEY also takes strong exception to [ ]'s propensity for apodictic sounding statements not based on facts. He had caught [ ] on several inaccuracies, which could have

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had serious consequences inasmuch as SCHUMACHER had been relying to an increasing extent upon the information provided by the [ ] Apparat. [ ] CALLET claimed, had gotten into the habit of never admitting that there could possibly be a question to which he did not know the answer. This had led him to give SCHUMACHER information of a strictly conjectural nature without so indicating.

I need not emphasize that the above information should not be leaked to [ ] in any shape or form. It is my opinion that the information is substantially correct inasmuch as CALLET had always taken special pains in standing up for his party associates. CALLET did not imply that [ ] closeness to the Americans has anything to do with his fall from favor. (Field Comment: I should, however, bear in mind that any ostentatious display of mutual cordiality is liable to be misunderstood and that [ ] interest would probably best be served by not making him appear as too closely allied with American interests outside the sphere of intelligence where those interests coincide.)

5. In recent talks with [ ] I have noticed some stray symptoms of deviation from the Party line. On the occasion of my September meeting with him, he conceded that the SPD's insistence upon a four power conference could no longer be considered realistic. At the same time, however, he intimated that the SPD would continue its doctrinaire adherence to the Party line (including four power conference) until after the 1953 elections. Even while in the United States he had admitted that the rank and file of the SPD followership in the Western Zone of Germany is baffled and exasperated by the Party's stand on West German rearmament. [ ] told me two weeks ago that [ ] material had in the main been instrumental in alerting the Party to a serious cleavage. [ ] surmised that [ ] may have been making use of this material in an attempt to change the Party's line on West German rearmament.

Approved by

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